

Report
to the
Department of National Defence
on the
On-Line Consultation
Defence Program Update
prepared by
Jordan, Nesbitt and Associates Ltd.

Published on 20 December 2002

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Executive summary

On 6 August 2002 the Hon. John McCallum, Minister of National Defence, launched an on-line consultation site on the World Wide Web as part of the federal government's update of the National Defence program. He invited interested Canadians to respond electronically to a series of 10 questions, and to comment on the issues raised by the questions. The site was open for 6½ weeks, until 20 September.

This report summarizes the main issues and trends in responses from the public to 10 topics, derived from 17,642 comments totalling more than 1,000,000 words:

- Two-thirds of the respondents (66.5%) felt that the frequency of domestic and international operations involving the Canadian Forces — the *operational tempo* — will increase in the next decade, largely because of increasing tension overseas, risks to and within Canada, and the Forces' existing expertise in peacekeeping and peacemaking. About 15% of the respondents, however, believed that limitations on the number of personnel and appropriate equipment mean that the number of operations will be the same or fewer.
- More than three-quarters of the respondents (79.1%) judged that the Canadian Forces' abilities to respond quickly during a crisis — their *rapid deployment* capabilities — are severely limited, because Canada does not have the large aircraft and naval vessels necessary to transport our troops and their heavy equipment over long distances. Some noted that the Forces' capabilities would depend on whether the tasks were within Canada or overseas.
- The *number of personnel* in the Canadian Forces is too low, 80.1% of the respondents believed, given the commitments they are expected to carry out. Others observed that the appropriate number depends on the responsibilities assigned them by the government. More than half of the respondents (56.8%) did not agree with cutting back on new equipment as a way of keeping or increasing the size of the Forces — many felt that a spending balance was important.
- Some 84.2% of the respondents — the second-highest level in the consultation — did not believe that the Canadian Forces have the necessary *equipment* for operations at home and abroad. Many noted

that the Forces have the right equipment for certain tasks, but that they are missing much essential equipment (especially the aircraft and ships needed for overseas service). Most respondents gave examples of future equipment requirements.

- A large majority of the respondents (60.2%) felt that the Canadian Forces should focus more on their *high-technology capabilities*, both to increase the impact that a small number of troops can have on today's battlefield and to be compatible with our allies' equipment. Cost seemed to be an important consideration for some of those respondents who felt that the Forces should focus about the same on high technology as they do now.
- Respondents did not have firm views one way or the other about how much *infrastructure* the Department of National Defence should be responsible for. About a quarter (25.3%) felt that less infrastructure was appropriate, 19.5% suggested more than now, and another 19.5% believed that the current amount is about right.
- Nearly two-thirds of the respondents (63.5%) said that the Canadian Forces should improve their ability to work together on operations — their *interoperability* — with Canada's closest allies, especially the United States. A strong undercurrent in the responses was the theme of maintaining Canadian sovereignty and independence.
- About half of the respondents (52.6%) believed that the Canadian Forces could do more to improve the *quality of life* for members and their families. Some said that further improvements might help in retaining current members and attracting new recruits, and that Canada owes the best quality of life to people who risk their lives for us. Nearly a quarter of the respondents felt that the Forces should continue doing the same, given recent improvements.
- Well over half of the respondents (57.6%) judged that the current approach to *the Reserves* is generally appropriate, but others noted that many improvements are probably necessary, especially legislated job protection, better training and better equipment.
- The *Defence budget* must be increased to pay for better equipment and more personnel, said 87.6% of the respondents — the highest level received in the consultation. Some suggested an increase to the average of NATO nations as a percentage of GDP. Their reasons for an increase included defending Canadian sovereignty (particularly in the Arctic), helping to reduce international tension, carrying our weight, defending

our way of life and our freedom, and supporting our allies. Several of the small number of responses in the *it depends* category mentioned that the size of the budget depends on what commitments the government expects the Forces to carry out.

Three appendices appear at the end of this report: one offering samples of responses to each of the questions, one summarizing the respondents' priorities for future military equipment, and another analysing the respondents' comments on the need for a full defence policy review.

Introduction

On 6 August 2002 the Hon. John McCallum, Minister of National Defence, launched an on-line consultation site on the World Wide Web (www.forces.gc.ca/menu/consult) as part of the federal government's update of the National Defence program. He invited interested Canadians to respond electronically to a series of 10 questions, and to comment on the issues raised by the questions. The site was open for 6½ weeks, until 20 September.

The Department of National Defence asked Jordan, Nesbitt and Associates Ltd., an Ottawa-based consultancy, to analyse the responses and prepare an independent report for the Minister outlining the main issues and trends. This report summarizes the views expressed by the public during the on-line consultation. Malcolm Jordan and Bruce Nesbitt were the lead analysts for the project, and Bruce Nesbitt wrote the report.

By the end of the consultation period we received 17,642 valid responses to individual questions, totalling more than 1,000,000 words. We were interested to see that most respondents seemed to take the consultation quite seriously, usually expressing their views thoughtfully and at some length.

The consultation was not intended to be an opinion poll of a representative sample of Canadians. Respondents commented on the questions as they saw fit, which allowed us more latitude to recognize gradations in their responses (such as *it depends*). All opinions on defence-related issues in this report are those of the respondents, individually or collectively.

Respondents were frank in what they wrote, and we have occasionally quoted them directly to give a flavour of the diversity of views we encountered. A few offered comments along the lines of "this novel consultation" being "most welcome", and a few objected to what they felt were directed questions ("this request for comments is actually a poll of civilian support in disguise").

Each of the 10 issues appears in a separate section, led off by the question asked on the Web site and followed by a numerical table of responses and our summary analysis. The tables include only valid responses — that is, we deleted test messages from the electronic files we received, and from the remaining total of 18,543 responses we eliminated 901 duplicate responses (perhaps sent inadvertently by the respondents). The data include 408 valid responses from members of the public who submitted them by mail or

facsimile. We did not see nor did we ask to see the e-mail addresses of respondents — we knew only the province or territory of origin and the time of submission. Although the consultation site was available in both official languages, a very high proportion of the respondents chose to answer in English.

Three appendices appear at the end of this report. Appendix A offers samples of responses to each of the questions. Appendix B provides a summary list of the respondents' priorities for military equipment ("is there any type of equipment that the Canadian Forces will require in the future that they do not currently have?"). And Appendix C analyses the respondents' comments on the need for a full defence policy review.

1. Operational tempo

Since the end of the Cold War, the Canadian Forces have been asked to sustain significant and simultaneous overseas commitments in multiple theatres around the world. From Europe to Asia, Africa to Latin America, and here in Canada, the Canadian Forces have deployed more than 70 times since 1989. Do you think that they will be asked to do more, about the same or less over the next decade?

More	1,329	66.5
The same	209	10.5%
Less	80	4.0%
It depends	54	2.7%
Same or more	157	7.8%
Same or less	8	0.4%
Non-responsive or ambiguous	163	8.1%
Total	2,000	100%

Respondents were clear about their sense of the Canadian Forces' being asked to serve more frequently in domestic and international operations in the future — that is, the operational tempo would increase. Most seemed to base their opinions on three broad factors: increasing international tension, risks to and within Canada, and our existing expertise in peacekeeping and peacemaking.

Internationally, they generally identified unpredictable instability stemming from terrorism, perennial hot spots and localized violence as the main reason for calling on our Forces. Some noted that humanitarian assistance will be necessary because of climate changes and AIDS in Africa (which could lead to violence). A few suggested that crimes against humanity might require our assistance.

Domestically, they identified terrorist threats, disaster relief, monitoring Canada's coastlines and the Arctic, and international crime (such as drug smuggling) as reasons for a larger number of future missions. Some

suggested that increasing pressure from the U.S. to defend North America will be another reason.

Many respondents commented on Canada's track record as a source of requests: "our reputation for protecting those who are oppressed" and the fact that "we do not hang around to exploit areas once peace is restored", for example.

A number of respondents observed that the federal government seemed overly willing to commit the Canadian Forces despite their being overstretched — "a political chip to be played to ensure Government of Canada engagement and consultation within the inner circle of multinational forums such as the G8".

Among respondents who felt that the operational tempo would remain *the same* as it is now, limitations on the number of personnel and appropriate equipment seemed to be an important reason.

Respondents who indicated that the Canadian Forces would be asked to do the *same or more* often based their comments on the international situation, although many noted that a shortage of personnel will create difficulties in meeting our obligations.

For respondents who believed that our commitments would be *fewer* in the future, a lack of people, training and technology was the predominant reason: "Canada needs to keep its seat at the international table, but you won't get a seat if you don't come dressed for dinner."

The main variable in the *it depends* category centred in the question of whether or not the Canadian Forces would see future increases in personnel and equipment, and hence "how our capability is perceived by our allies and the international community".

2. Rapid deployment

Do you believe the Canadian Forces are able to respond during a crisis as quickly as they need to? Why or why not?

Yes	107	5.9
No	1,427	79.1
It depends	186	10.3%
Same or more	—	—
Same or less	—	—
Non-responsive or ambiguous	85	4.7%
Total	1,805	100%

The respondents' very high *no* answer to the Canadian Forces' ability to deploy rapidly was nearly always followed by the overwhelming reason: Canada does not have the large aircraft and naval vessels necessary to transport our troops and their heavy equipment over long distances.

Many respondents cited our experience in getting to Afghanistan as embarrassing, because we had to hitchhike with the Americans. A very few noted that the air transport-sharing arrangement with the U.S. has served Canada well, but that our place in line during a crisis is not guaranteed.

Some felt that Canada does not have enough high-readiness personnel, and others that the Canadian Forces are "over-tasked, ill-equipped and undertrained for the types of missions they will likely face." Still others believed that the troops' training is in fact appropriate.

Other reasons they gave included the Canadian Forces' lack of air-to-air refuelling, underfunded and underequipped Reserve forces, the lack of parts for our aging Hercules aircraft (East Timor was cited), and the Forces' having more married than single members (which can affect who is deployed and for how long).

One interesting reason put forward was the government's decision-making process: "our military planners had options days after 11 September; however, our machinery of government took weeks to commit to a course of action.... We need to enhance the role of the Privy Council Office to take options to Cabinet for rapid decision."

Within the *it depends* category, a common response was to distinguish between international and domestic deployments: "Si la crise se déroulait au Canada, l'action de l'armée pourrait être immédiate. Cependant, à cause du manque de moyens de transports de troupes, il serait assez difficile aux soldats canadiens de se rendre à un endroit à l'extérieur du Canada sans aide d'un autre pays." Our domestic capacities did not extend to British Columbia — especially in case of a major earthquake — or the far North, in the minds of a number of respondents.

Respondents in the *it depends* category did not seem to be suggesting that Canada should only focus on rapid deployment within the country; rather most appeared to want Canada to have the capacity in the future to act both inside and outside the country. As one put it, "the question is not whether the Canadian Forces can 'respond' quickly enough but whether they can provide an *appropriate* response in a timely manner and whether they can *sustain* that response for a sufficient period of time to effect a favourable outcome (as defined by Canadians)."

One respondent noted of the South-West Asia campaign that "Canada's military has done remarkably well to respond to the present crisis in the way in which it has. We've deployed ships, aircraft, and ground troops to a hostile environment half way around the globe; for the first time in a generation we've committed our army to an active combat role. But at what cost? The fact that we have not replaced our battle group in Afghanistan demonstrates how little reserve there is in our armed forces.... The question is not how the Canadian Forces have responded to the present (comparatively 'gentle') circumstances, but how and where it will find the resources to cope with potentially much greater and more demanding challenges in the future."

The small number who answered *yes* often cited the motivation of the troops as a positive factor, but occasionally tempered their comments by noting that we cannot support a continued and sustained response in a major crisis: "the Canadian Forces have been able to respond to critical situations but a great deal of 'make do' has been involved. Troops have acquitted

themselves admirably with obsolete equipment and limited support. I believe that the support issue is most important."

3. Number of personnel

The Canadian Forces are comprised of approximately 60,000 Regular Force (full-time) members and about 21,500 Primary Reservists (part-time members). Do you believe that the Canadian Forces have enough personnel for operations at home and abroad?

Yes	83	4.9%
No	1,352	80.1%
It depends	97	5.7%
Same or more	10	0.6%
Same or less	2	0.1%
Non-responsive or ambiguous	145	8.6%
Total	1,689	100%

The strong *no* response to the appropriateness of the current Canadian Forces' personnel level appeared to reflect two main concerns among respondents: that there are too few members of the Forces to carry out all the jobs which the government has given them, and that the real level of effective personnel is significantly lower than the figure given in the question's preamble.

Responses raising the first concern often seemed to be related to the earlier question about future increases in the number of operations: "there are not enough forces to protect the homeland and be at war and have other responsibilities at the same time":

a military force of a country of 30 million with (a) the world's second-largest land mass, (b) one of the world's longest coast lines, c) boundaries and regions where there are potential jurisdictional disputes (Arctic, continental shelf, fishing

boundaries, etc.), (d) a strong desire to have an influence on world affairs and to make a contribution to global stability, and (e) vast resources that are subject to increasing demand...needs a military capability that is reasonably proportional to these requirements. In the global village, Canada can no longer depend on the illusion that the rest of the world is "far away".

Another respondent pointed out that "with terrorism and the new threat of war, a country with a reputation such as Canada's has to be ready for any possibility. What if there's a war with Iraq? Is Canada just going to sit silent, as we do not have adequate forces to make a large contribution? The Canadian Forces need to return to the world-respected 'peacekeepers' that we are."

As a second concern, many respondents objected to the 60,000 figure for full-time members, given the number of people who are currently away on missions, just returning, training for departure, medically unfit, and on various kinds of leave. Representative comments ranged from "we're lucky to have 55,000, on a good day" to "we are sitting closer to 50,000 personnel right now, and that will only get worse in the next few years".

Some respondents who identified themselves as Canadian Forces members also suggested that without more personnel, burnout from overwork was a problem; others noted the stress on families, and many observed that problems with retention and recruiting are becoming serious issues. A few expressed disillusionment, addressing the Minister directly:

I have just completed 15 years of [Air Force] service within the 500 series trade and I have never seen it this bad....
[C]ome see first hand what we do to keep our Sea Kings flying. See what the technicians have to work with, get dirty with the troops, spend time with an operational unit instead of having tea and crumpets with the officers and listening to them tell you that everything is fine.

Sir, as a Master Seaman Weapons Technician...I can say from experience that we are in dire need of more people. I have had a few of my subordinates come to me relating their feelings of being "stuck in a rut" with no way out. I have seen people being prevented from taking trade-related upgrade training and others have their leave cancelled because the ship could not sail without them due to manning shortages. I love the

Navy sir, I love serving my country. When I did boardings in the Gulf Of Oman, I was proud of being a Canadian, in a dangerous part of the world, doing a job that I love to do. But we are getting tired.

Respondents who commented on the size of the Reserves generally felt that both the Regular forces and the Reserves should be larger, but no clear indication of the relative balance between them emerged.

In the *it depends* category, several noted that the appropriate number depends on the Canadian Forces' responsibilities: "the important question...is how does a relatively small, but well-developed country such as Canada ensure a semblance of homeland security while at the same time contribute significantly to world peace and security? This depends very much on the federal government defining the niche that Canada fulfills in the world, and focussing Canadian resources on the goals."

Those who answered *yes* suggested having a better-equipped, well-trained fast-reaction force, reducing the number of overseas assignments, and reducing what they saw as the unnecessary number of administrative and civilian personnel in the Department.

Should we try to maintain (or even increase) the number of Canadian Forces personnel, even if this means decreasing funding for sophisticated new equipment?

Yes	116	6.9%
No	954	56.8%
It depends	70	4.2%
Same or more	—	—
Same or less	—	—
Non-responsive or ambiguous	540	32.1%
Total	1,680	100%

The *no* responses to this subsidiary question most often reflected respondents' objections to the idea of what one called "an immoral trade-off". A recurring and strong theme was that we need both more personnel

and sophisticated new equipment — a frequently used term was the need for a “balance” between the two.

The relatively high number of *non-responsive or ambiguous* responses seemed to stem from many respondents’ reluctance or inability to give a straightforward answer: “more people with rusted equipment is no more effective than too few people with new equipment”, for example, and “reducing one to satisfy the other will do nothing”.

Among respondents who answered *yes*, some felt that “there does not need to be a trade-off of personnel and equipment”: “we can leave the expensive war toys to our allies to the south”.

A not uncommon view among those who noted that *it depends* was that “a more reasonable approach is to decide what capabilities Canada needs and to man, equip and fund appropriately”— “the only acceptable way ahead is to properly equip sufficient numbers of soldiers, sailors and airmen and women to perform the tasks mandated by government”.

4. Equipment

Do you believe that the Canadian Forces have the necessary equipment to carry out operations at home and abroad?

Yes	67	4.5%
No	1,253	84.2%
It depends	68	4.5%
Same or more	—	—
Same or less	—	—
Non-responsive or ambiguous	101	6.8%
Total	1,489	100%

The extremely strong *no* response — the second-highest level in the consultation — was not an unthinking reaction on the part of most respondents to the question of whether the Canadian Forces have adequate equipment. Their comments were frequently nuanced, and often carefully argued.

Many respondents distinguished between kinds of operations — for example, “nos armées sont probablement suffisamment dotées pour des opérations de basse intensité, mais pas de moyenne ou haute.” Similarly some noted that international and domestic operations would require different equipment.

A general theme was that the Canadian Forces have necessary equipment for certain tasks, but they are missing much essential equipment — especially for overseas service — such as the large aircraft and ships necessary for moving troops and their weapons and supplies, shipborne helicopters, new trucks and appropriate combat uniforms.

Responses in the *it depends* category usually centred in the government's defence and foreign policy: “it depends on our expectations. If we want our forces to be rapidly deployable, then we do not have the equipment we need.... What is more important is keeping what we now have up-to-date.”

Those who answered *yes* occasionally pointed out that the equipment-management process is faulty, and that sometimes "the needs of politics outweigh the needs of the Canadian Forces" in procuring equipment.

Is there any type of equipment that the Canadian Forces will require in the future that they do not currently have?

Most respondents gave examples of future equipment requirements, some in great detail. The most frequently recurring seemed to be heavy-lift transport aircraft, supply vessels (particularly roll on-roll off), shipborne and attack helicopters, and new fighter jets. Other requirements identified by the respondents included heavy-lift transport helicopters, replacement maritime patrol aircraft, air-to-air refuelling tankers, new area defence destroyers to replace the *Iroquois* class, new tanks, appropriate uniforms, better vehicles and equipment for Arctic surveillance.

Appendix B provides a summary list of the respondents' priorities for military equipment.

5. High-tech capabilities

Should the Canadian Forces focus more, less or about the same on high-tech capabilities (such as precision guided weapons and advanced information systems)?

More	703	60.2%
The same	138	11.8%
Less	32	2.7%
It depends	104	8.9%
Same or more	35	3.0%
Same or less	—	—
Non-responsive or ambiguous	156	13.4%
Total	1,168	100%

Respondents were generally unambiguous in their views that the Canadian Forces should focus more on high technology, for two main reasons.

First, they felt that high-tech capabilities greatly extend the impact that a small number of troops can have on today's battlefield. Second, they said that the Canadian Forces "must remain at least current with the technologies being used today in the field [and]...compatible with our Allied counterparts".

For respondents who felt that the Forces should focus about the *same* on high technology, cost seemed to be an important consideration: "plus les systèmes sont sophistiqués, plus ils sont coûteux". Canada can readily buy proven systems off the shelf (mainly to save lives in combat), several observed.

Responses within the *it depends* category usually raised one of two points: that the necessary capabilities would vary with the mission, and that "obviously, a reasonable balance has to be struck between equipment of different levels of sophistication". Some mentioned that our Forces do not necessarily need sophisticated new tanks and aircraft if a major problem is

the lack of individually portable and cheaper equipment for the low-tech soldier.

Respondents who believed that Canada should focus *less* on high technology often noted that because the U.S. has the equipment already, we should concentrate on everyday items for peacekeeping, for search and rescue, and to counter domestic criminal activities.

If more, what high-tech capabilities should they focus on? If less, what high-tech capabilities should be eliminated?

Many respondents noted that "information and communications systems should be a major focus", and weapon delivery systems "to maximize firepower with less combat hazard" to our Forces. A few suggested that "we must decide what areas we have a strength in and we should focus on those areas, such as our present focus on ground reconnaissance using the Coyote".

For the most part respondents gave few clear responses to what we can do without.

6. Infrastructure

*With a presence in every province and territory, Defence is responsible for the largest amount of infrastructure (such as buildings, properties and roads) in the federal government. **Should Defence increase, maintain the same level or decrease the amount of infrastructure for which it is currently responsible?***

More	241	19.5%
The same	241	19.5%
Less	312	25.3%
It depends	155	12.6%
Same or more	60	4.9%
Same or less	27	2.2%
Non-responsive or ambiguous	197	16.0%
Total	1,233	100%

This question about the level of Defence infrastructure drew the least conclusive responses of all the questions — each of *more*, *the same* and *less* was in approximately the same range.

The main reason given by respondents who felt that Defence could have *less* infrastructure was saving money: by consolidation and centralization (if site cleanup costs don't exceed the cost of keeping a site, a few noted), and perhaps by turning over roads and water services to local governments.

Respondents who felt that Defence should increase its infrastructure (*more*) offered several grounds: for a trained military presence in every province that can provide a timely response to emergencies, to upgrade the existing stock, and to create public visibility for — and confidence in — the Forces, including the Reserves. More sites could aid recruitment, a few noted.

Some of those preferring that Defence maintain *the same* infrastructure observed that getting rid of any more stock would mean “hamstringing ourselves if we need to expand our forces rapidly in the face of future large-

scale conflict or war". Others added that the existing stock could be managed better. The word "maintain" may have confused a few respondents, who read it in the sense of repair and maintenance rather than "to keep".

Respondents answering in the *it depends* category observed that requirements vary from province to province, that Defence should rationalise what it has, and that cost-effectiveness, not political considerations, should be the determining factor in deciding military infrastructure issues.

For respondents who believed that Defence should have the *same or more* infrastructure, the principal concerns seemed to be the possibility of a stronger Defence presence in areas they felt were underserved (B.C. and the North, for example), or for future operational needs ("it is not wrong to have unused infrastructure waiting for [a] requirement to arise").

The small number of respondents who felt that the *same or less* infrastructure was appropriate mostly noted that fewer major bases could be better sited for Defence purposes nationally. Some observed that consolidation would require better military transportation to move troops and their equipment from widely separated bases to wherever in the country they might be needed.

7. Interoperability

The ability to work together on operations with Canada's closest allies has been a priority for Canadian Forces in recent years. Do you believe that Canada should enhance, maintain the same level, or decrease this ability to work with our closest allies?

More	832	63.8%
The same	209	16.0%
Less	34	2.6%
It depends	28	2.1%
Same or more	83	6.4%
Same or less	4	0.3%
Non-responsive or ambiguous	115	8.8%
Total	1,305	100%

Respondents who stated that the Canadian Forces should increase their ability to work with our closest allies (*more*) — or “interoperability” — did so for a variety of reasons.

Most took our closest ally to be the United States, with whom it is important to work, they said, because it is our largest trading partner, because we cannot “go it alone” (a phrase used several times), because we share a common border and responsibilities for continental defence, and because we depend on the U.S. for our own defence. One noted that “we will be under greater pressure than most nations to respond favourably when U.S. national interests are raised. The key, then, is to have our forces credible in the eyes of the U.S.”

Several respondents mentioned other allies: the U.K. in particular, Australia, New Zealand, and NATO generally. They often saw interoperability as a means of extending our influence internationally, and fulfilling our international obligations.

A strong undercurrent — even in the responses calling for more interoperability — was maintaining Canadian sovereignty and independence. As one respondent put it, “we need to be particularly careful when working with the Americans. Their foreign policies are not necessarily in harmony with [those] of Canada, and indeed neither are their [military] doctrines.” Another commented that “Canada should look for ways of becoming independent through the purchase of military stores that allow the Canadian Forces to work alone. Close ties should be maintained but on Canadian terms.”

Respondents who gave a reason for choosing *the same* — and many in the *same or more* category — often mentioned that the Canadian Forces have little choice, given Canada’s treaties and the lack of equipment and personnel, and that we have a moral duty to contribute to international order. Some commented on excessive American influence.

There was little consistency in reasons among respondents who answered *less*: for example, “we should stay out of affairs that do not affect national security”, our allies don’t care because of our weakness, and Canada has no role as a world power.

Those who responded that *it depends* usually noted that interoperability depends on the place the Canadian Forces have in implementing Canadian foreign policy.

The tiny number responding the *same or less* raised the question of over-dependence on our allies.

8. Quality of life

In response to the 1998 report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, Defence has made substantial improvements in such areas as pay and benefits, parental leave and cost of living arrangements for personnel who are required to move. Should the Canadian Forces do more, about the same or less regarding the quality of life of their members and that of their families?

More	643	52.6%
The same	291	23.8%
Less	45	3.7%
It depends	5	0.4%
Same or more	47	3.8%
Same or less	12	1.0%
Non-responsive or ambiguous	180	14.7%
Total	1,223	100%

The comparatively low number of *more* responses and high number of *the same* seemed to indicate that most respondents welcomed recent improvements to the Canadian Forces' quality of life.

Many respondents who called for *more* noted that further improvements would help to attract new recruits, that they would aid in retaining current Force members, and that Canada owes the best quality of life to people who risk their lives for us.

Among respondents who felt that the Canadian Forces should continue doing *the same*, many felt that we have a good balance now, a few said that the current quality-of-life program is one of the best in the world, and others tempered their view that pay is good with comments that problems with personnel levels and the operational tempo are unresolved. That is, the quality of *working* life is at issue: "Peter has been robbed to pay Paul."

Those responses in the *same or more* category often mentioned points raised by respondents in both *the same* and the *more* categories — that pay, for example, is adequate but other specific items need attention.

The small number who advocated doing *less* — and the much smaller number in the *same or less* category — noted that the Forces should spend more on equipment and training, that job satisfaction is more important than money, and that troops are not children — they know what they're signing up for.

The relatively large number of *non-responsive or ambiguous* comments often seemed to come from Canadian Forces respondents with a specific complaint, or members of the public unclear on the concept of the military quality of life. Some remaining problems that were mentioned include long-term disability benefits, Permanent Married Quarters rent, discrepancies with the Reserves in certain allowances, single members' receiving fewer benefits than married members, and instances of people abusing the current system with apparent impunity.

There was no consistent reason given by the tiny number responding that *it depends*.

If more, is there anything the Canadian Forces could stop doing — or do less of — to fund new "quality of life" initiatives?

Respondents who felt that the Canadian Forces could do more did not choose items to cut; rather they tended to observe that the quality of work life was now the main issue.

9. The Reserves

The Reserves provide an important link between the Canadian Forces and local communities and a component of the Total Force that integrates full- and part-time military personnel. As part of this concept, Regulars provide the government with a ready response capability, while the Reserves augment and help sustain Regular units and, in some cases, perform their own unique tasks, such as the crewing of maritime coastal defence vessels. In recent years, the Reserves have played a significant role both at home (the 1998 ice storm in Eastern Canada) and on overseas operations (Balkans). Is this approach (as discussed above) to the Reserves appropriate? Why or why not?

Yes	650	57.6%
No	311	27.6%
It depends	56	5.0%
Same or more	—	—
Same or less	—	—
Non-responsive or ambiguous	111	9.8%
Total	1,128	100%

This question drew the fewest responses of all, possibly because members of the public may be less familiar with the role and contribution of the Reserves.

The *yes* response level was not overwhelming, and often incorporated an implied *yes, but* — yes, the approach is appropriate, but we need to use the Reserves more, and they need a larger budget, more personnel, better pay and benefits, training equivalent to that received by Regular members, and (especially) legislated job protection. Reservists “need to feel like a wanted and important part of the Canadian military family. They want overwhelmingly to be trained to a high standard, to be forced to maintain

that standard and to feel trusted by their peers in the Regular Force and their superiors in the Canadian Forces chain of command.”

A number of respondents commented on the ratio of Reserve to Regular Force members, observing that the Reserves “should be a multiple of the Regular Forces, rather than a fraction.”

Those who answered *no* — that the current approach to the Reserves is not appropriate — offered many reasons: the Reserves have little credibility, their units are not up to strength, they are posted as individuals rather than units (hence diminishing their effectiveness), they are undertrained compared to the Regulars, and in general they are more “weekend golfers” compared to Regulars, although they are important in wartime and as links to their communities.

One respondent claimed that the Reserves do not in fact provide enough of a link to local communities because “Highland and British themes...don’t reflect the new multicultural Canada...Why not Sikh regiments, or Caribbean regiments, or Chinese regiments”?

A few respondents commented on what they saw as the lack of clear mandates: “the Reserves need to have unique roles defined for them and then be funded to accomplish those roles.” Others felt that the Naval Reserve already has a clear role in operating coastal patrol vessels, “the Air Force has few Reserves, with very specific missions”, but the Army Reserve has “no *raison d’être* other than augmentation” of the Regular Force — “a temp agency”.

The reasons for the *it depends* responses differed, including whether the Reserves are used at home or overseas, what the government decides the role of the Reserves is to be, whether they receive proper training and equipment, and whether they are cost-effective.

10. The Defence budget

*Defence spending for 2002–2003 currently stands at \$11.8 billion.
Should the defence budget increase, stay the same or decrease?*

More	1,280	87.6%
The same	41	2.8%
Less	11	0.8%
It depends	74	5.0%
Same or more	2	0.1%
Same or less	1	0.1%
Non-responsive or ambiguous	53	3.6%
Total	1,462	100%

The extremely strong *more* response to the size of the Defence budget was the highest level received in the consultation.

Overwhelmingly the reasons given by respondents were for better equipment and for more personnel. Other reasons included responding to increased international tension, defending Canadian sovereignty (particularly in the Arctic), carrying our weight, defending our way of life and our freedom, and supporting our allies. Many respondents suggested that the budget should increase at least to the NATO average as a percentage of GDP, and some noted that most of the increase would eventually return to Canada and Canadians.

Responses in the *it depends* category generally involved variations on what commitments the government expects the Forces to carry out — comments such as “the government should decide what level of defence they need and then fund accordingly”, and “if you do not ask them to do more, then leave it as it is; if you ask them to do more, then fund them accordingly”.

The small number who said that the budget should remain *the same* usually referred to excessive bureaucracy and reducing waste: funds need to be spent more wisely, some said, and overhead should be reduced.

For the very few respondents who called for *less*, the reasons mainly had to do with the need for more efficiently managed spending.

Should additional funding for Defence be one of the Government's top priorities?

Yes	615	42.1%
No	30	2.1%
It depends	7	0.5%
Same or more	—	—
Same or less	—	—
Non-responsive or ambiguous	808	55.3%
Total	1,460	100%

The unusually high number of *non-responsive or ambiguous* responses to this subsidiary question largely reflected the failure of respondents to answer the question — many, perhaps, because they felt that by answering *more* in the previous part, they were implying that additional funding should be a top priority.

Among those who responded *yes*, many included Defence as one of the federal government's top three priorities, with health care and education [*sic*]. Occasionally respondents included the environment as a further priority.

The small number who responded *no* said either that Defence should be only one priority among many, or that the government believes that Defence spending is not a priority among the general public, compared to other needs.

Appendices

A. Sample responses

This appendix contains 45 samples of responses sent in by the public to the on-line consultation, among the total of 17,642 responses that we received, read and analysed.

For each of the 10 topics we have included one complete response in every category that received at least 1% of the responses to the question. We have not included any examples of non-responsive or ambiguous responses. We chose each sample because it was representative of comments generally (or of a specific point) within a particular category, or because it expressed an interesting point of view forcefully.

We were conscious that participants in the consultation typed in their thoughts on line without an opportunity to edit their responses. For the sake of clarity here we have expanded contractions and abbreviations, corrected spelling errors and punctuation, and very occasionally added explanatory phrases in [square] brackets.

1. Operational tempo

Since the end of the Cold War, the Canadian Forces have been asked to sustain significant and simultaneous overseas commitments in multiple theatres around the world. From Europe to Asia, Africa to Latin America, and here in Canada, the Canadian Forces have deployed more than 70 times since 1989. Do you think that they will be asked to do more, about the same or less over the next decade?

More (66.5%):

"In the coming decade I believe that Canadian leaders will ask more of the Canadian Forces than has been the case in the previous decade. Indeed, given the state of existing conflicts, current instabilities in the world, potential new conflicts and the increase in potential environmental impacts from climate change, the demands upon the Canadian Forces could significantly increase in the coming decade. Any destabilizing event could require combat troops in a combat setting such as in Afghanistan, a peacekeeping mission, a domestic deployment similar to the [January 1998] ice storm or the combination of any of these (this latter situation being increasingly likely and the most difficult to manage). Further, there is one caveat to my response: if it becomes apparent that the Canadian Forces do not have the capability to fulfil a potential demand, then politicians may be reluctant to make any requests. The danger in this situation is that any inability to meet a potential request could significantly weaken Canadian sovereignty and the ability of the Canadian government to serve Canadian interests at home, to our alliances and in the world at large."

The same (10.5%):

"I believe the Canadian Forces will be asked to do about the same number of deployments in the future, but I also believe that the Canadian Forces will be forced to turn down a number of these requests, due to lack of personnel or equipment."

Less (4.0%):

"The Canadian Forces will be asked to contribute less toward NATO, NORAD, and the UN. This is based on our recent performance in these arenas. Because of our lack of resources currently and in the recent past, we are becoming minor participants and are almost at the point of being irrelevant. In some cases, we have even been asked to leave a theatre of operations because we were so dependant on others for support. We could not effectively participate in one campaign due to the inaccuracy and

unreliability of our assets. This is very unacceptable. If we can't dance the dance, we shouldn't go to the ball."

It depends (2.7%):

"While any answer can only be speculative, the evolving situation around the globe is unlikely to become more stable. Increasing competition for viable resources in the Americas, South and South-East Asia, Africa and the Middle East will contribute to an increased likelihood of conflict in those regions for at least the next decade. How involved the Canadian Forces will be is dependent on the inclination of the government and indirectly the public to commit resources to external crises."

"While there has been a tendency in recent years for people to look inward, catastrophic events can remind them of how small the world is. If the Canadian government wishes to be taken seriously as a leader, even of middle powers, then intervention in selected conflict areas will probably increase. If not, then there is no issue. The Canadian Forces and the government will respond only when forced to as a minor player and will accept an increasing sense of irrelevance. I expect the Canadian Forces to be as involved in overseas issues as in the past [because] accepting a completely passive role in the world would probably not be an acceptable position for the political leadership nor for the public. What would clarify the issue would be a policy that identifies broad national goals (not simply the military or foreign policy) for the next 25 or 50 years. Without it Canada will continue to bend with the wind."

Same or more (7.8%):

"Do we intend to use the Canadian Forces as an instrument of foreign policy? If so, how? Based on polls, Canadians appear to support our role as a global citizen to include use of military forces for things like peacekeeping and stabilization operations. There are plenty of reasons to suggest that our global partners expect this too, so it is not reasonable to suggest a reduction from current commitments. There are plenty of good arguments for upholding our current military use, to include providing validity to international [treaties] like the Geneva Convention,

organizations like the UN or NATO, and to achieve our stated foreign policy aim of global peace and security. I believe future missions should have a UN mandate, but not under the control of the UN. Given the above points I expect commitments to remain constant or possibly increase."

"The current world situation should also be considered. Should Canada ever come under attack (even if directed toward US interest), there will be public calls for action. This may have the propensity of compelling us to unforeseen levels of commitments unlike anything encountered since Korea. That risk, and the expectations of the public that the Canadian Forces provide the defence service when needed, must be carefully considered."

2. Rapid deployment

Do you believe the Canadian Forces are able to respond during a crisis as quickly as they need to? Why or why not?

Yes (5.9%):

"Yes, the Canadian Forces can still respond during a crisis. The Canadian Forces have always responded to every crisis whenever called upon to do so over the past 110 years. The level of response as measured against the need is the question. Are there enough Canadian Forces resources available to respond to modern demands on its men and women, vehicles, weapons and equipment? Are the Canadian Forces funded to conduct the business at hand and plan for the future? Can we afford to commit our Canadian Forces resources today and fear not having them tomorrow when the next crisis surfaces? How do we prepare our sons and daughters for tomorrow's conflict with yesterday's vehicles, weapons and equipment?"

"There is no easy answer nor should there be. The lives of each Canadian Forces member, the tasks they are assigned and the 'good standing' Canada has in the global community are at risk. But remember those are the very issues that cause individual Canadian citizens to join the Canadian Forces. The Canadian Forces will continue to respond and continue to rationalize the level and size of the force tasked to respond but the Canadian Forces will always

respond when asked. It is disheartening to now believe that the day is approaching when wanting to respond and the ability to respond will not be in sync."

No (79.1%):

"The question of how fast is fast enough is directly related to readiness and strategic mobility. Each of these could be viewed as a sliding scale on which more capability costs more. For Canadian governments of the past 30-odd years, the question appears to have been 'How fast can I respond for the fixed amount of dollars I am willing to spend on defence?' rather than any kind of requirements-based analysis."

"We cannot respond fast enough. We lack the strategic mobility assets to get us to the fight. Our reliance on allied (U.S.) assets or commercial charter markets means that we are competing for lift resources when everybody else wants them too. The U.S. does not have enough airlift to meet its own requirements and has pursued pre-positioning. As we discovered in Afghanistan, U.S. airlift is not free and not cheap, and politically, we were reminded of the adage that 'beggars can't be choosers.' On the rental market, we are obliged to make early political decisions about our commitment in order to contract for the assets in the 'first come, first served' environment. We will pay premium prices based on the increased global demand. Readiness is a function of many supporting logistical and training factors, all of which have been bled white over the last few years. Lack of readiness equals increased response time. There is no point to having the taxi in the driveway if you aren't packed yet. Capability that cannot be applied in a timely fashion is useless."

It depends (10.3%):

"That depends what and where the crisis is. If the crisis is here in Canada and it is to help out another level of government like during the Ice Storm, the Forces are probably capable of responding quickly enough. If the response involves the movement of equipment as well as troops our geography could be a problem. If the crisis is off-shore, such as helping out hurricane victims or deploying our Army overseas to places such as Afghanistan or East Timor or Bosnia, the Canadian Forces are not adequately equipped."

“If Canada wants to be a ‘first responder’, be it for humanitarian assistance or war-fighting, the forces need to be able to get there quickly. Having to always lease transport or have the Americans help us out makes me feel like I live in a third-world country. The reason for not being able to respond quickly is that Canada simply does not have the range of lift capabilities needed. The Canadian Air Force needs to expand its transport fleet by adding a large heavy-lift aircraft. Moving everything by air would be unrealistic, so Canada should also consider either leasing transport ships the way Britain does or possibly purchase their own.”

3. Number of personnel

The Canadian Forces are comprised of approximately 60,000 Regular Force (full-time) members and about 21,500 Primary Reservists (part-time members). Do you believe that the Canadian Forces have enough personnel for operations at home and abroad?

Yes (4.9%):

"This question presupposes that total funds allocated to Defence will not increase; hopefully they will! Nevertheless, the issue is one of capability to respond in a timely fashion, and being able to sustain a viable and relevant force, when needed. The way world conflicts have evolved in the past decade, I believe that heavy, people-intensive forces are not the best way to respond to emergencies and conflicts a long way from our shores. They are rather to be used to stabilize or to help restore law and order (at one point, a police responsibility). Thus, higher tech (not top of the line) forces, capable of responding quickly to a developing conflict in a relevant fashion, is the correct response."

"In short, forces could be reduced a little to ensure that we continue to have funds to provide rapid, relevant power projection where Canada wishes to employ it and to sustain that force for as long as required. In short, a balance is required, but the emphasis must remain on quality rather than quantity."

No (80.1%):

"The Canadian Forces clearly need more people. When even a modest contribution to the war against terrorism in Afghanistan cannot be sustained for as long as our allies need us, it tarnishes Canada's reputation world-wide. The fact that several Navy vessels are inactive due to lack of crew also illustrates this."

"I believe that Regular and Reserve Force strength should be increased, at least to a level that would allow Canada to fulfill its 1994 White Paper obligations. Of course this would also greatly lessen the strain and fatigue felt by servicemen due to too-frequent deployments. However, I would absolutely *not* support a drop in

equipment funding to pay for increased troop levels. Personnel levels must rise *and* equipment quality must improve simultaneously. To trade off one for the other is simply unacceptable. I would be willing to support a substantial budget increase to achieve improvements in both personnel and equipment, even if this meant higher taxes (although I believe that this wouldn't be necessary)."

It depends (5.7%):

"The Department of National Defence has a mandate to defend the territory and interests of the nation and those of allies with whom we share common values, economic ties and commitments. In the final stages of the Cold War the nation had close to 90,000 personnel. These were hard pressed to meet commitments but had few of the operational challenges that we face today."

"The question that seems to avoided is what does the nation wish the forces to do with regard to national security, and as an adjunct to foreign and international economic policy. There appears to be no policy cohesion. It is difficult to answer this question without a clear articulation of the Forces' foreseen roles, and the previous White Paper seems hopelessly out of date with the current realities. As a response, I might suggest that 60,000 personnel and a handful of reserves is rather small considering our international stature as the eighth largest economy. My international diplomatic friends ask me why our nation always has to be 'first up to the microphone and last out with the check book.'"

Should we try to maintain (or even increase) the number of Canadian Forces personnel, even if this means decreasing funding for sophisticated new equipment?

Yes (6.9%):

"If we wish to respond to requests for international assistance, peacekeeping, peacemaking or other taskings, we have to be realistic. I feel that if we are going to respond to the international community in a strong peacekeeping role, and I believe we should respond, then we must increase the size of our forces. More specifically, we should be expanding the low-tech, effective peacekeeper numbers, while diminishing our high-tech expenses. Do

we need fighter aircraft? I do not see the need, when soldiers are underpaid, doing back-to-back deployments, and relying on overused equipment. We could easily do away with the 'glamour' of fighter aircraft and laser bombs to put that money into more useable tools for the peacekeeping soldier on the ground."

No (56.8%):

"Funding for new equipment is vital. We are already having trouble keeping up with our allies. That said, increasing the size of our Armed Forces is the only option. The Forces are clearly over-stretched, yet the government and the Canadian people want to continue to be a front-line player in all emerging conflicts. Our troops are getting worn out with repeated deployments. I also understand that most units are dramatically under-strength, and without their full entitlement of equipment and resources to do their jobs. Simply put, we can not afford to trade one for the other — we need more of both!"

It depends (4.2%):

"There are definitely not enough personnel. Before accepting a reduction in equipment, the focus and mandate of the Canadian Forces must be determined. Perhaps some equipment is not required, but it should be related to hard decisions of realignment, and not minimal reductions in all areas. For instance, while we have a proud Armoured Corps history, what is the effectiveness of the current Armoured Corps given its limited equipment? Is it critical for Canada to have such a small complement of main battle tanks? If there was a major conflict where tanks were involved in battle, is there a country in existence that Canada could be pitted against without any major ally? If the Armoured Corps was disbanded in that light, how many additional personnel positions could be created in infantry soldiers? Do we need submarines for fisheries patrol? Do we need the number of civilian positions that we currently have? Could some of the civilian positions be just as effectively filled by military personnel, creating a more favourable sea-shore or operational-non-operational ratio?"

4. Equipment

Do you believe that the Canadian Forces have the necessary equipment to carry out operations at home and abroad?

Yes (4.5%):

"Yes, the equipment the Canadian Forces currently have and are currently developing is sufficient to meet the needs of Canada, with a few exceptions. A decision must be made on the validity of retaining obsolete and costly tanks, which the Canadian Forces will likely never use again in a combat situation. A decision must be made and funding set aside to replace the CF-18, as combat aircraft have become increasingly important in modern conflict; the Joint Strike Fighter is a cost-effective and good tactical and strategic choice. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles require developing as well. The Navy requires an at-sea logistics platform and, of course, new helicopters. The Army needs a lighter, faster attack and reconnaissance helicopter to complement the Griffon [helicopter]."

No (84.2%):

"In a word, no. While not a perfect model, our military should be fashioned along the lines of the Australian Defence Force. For the Air Force, there must be a capability for continental defence (until this can be performed with Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles, this must be done by manned fighter-interceptors). Heavy lift is essential in order to fulfil the 1994 White Paper mandate. Otherwise we will be beholden to other powers in order to carry out our foreign policy. Attack and heavy-lift helicopters should be purchased in order to properly transport and defend our ground troops. Non-combat-related search and rescue is not a military function and should be privatised. The Canadian Forces should act as a secondary search-and-rescue asset. Maritime helicopters should be purchased as soon as possible, and armed with both anti-submarine torpedoes and anti-surface missiles. The Navy should be provided with a new class of major surface combatant at a minimum of every ten years. This includes logistic ships. Coastal defence vessels that can travel at (substantially) more than 15 knots should be acquired. The Army should at least be given the proper camouflage for the theatre in which they operate. They should also be provided with tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles."

It depends (4.5%):

"This is a difficult question to provide a response to, without a promulgated, politically agreed defence and foreign policy that articulates what the Forces will be expected to do. To acquire a list of equipment on a limited budget that tries to anticipate potential roles, I realize, is difficult. This choice is complicated even more by a lack of coherent security policy. Each operation that the Forces participate in requires a political objective, an agreed feasible mission and the capabilities to fulfill these. Almost any serious Canadian who reads about the world and looks to see a better future understands that the Forces are not well equipped in some areas, such as strategic air lift, precision weapons, adequate airborne surveillance and response capability both manned and unmanned, and the sheer size to sustain operations. But the Auditor General's report also underlined the lack of technical readiness with what we have and a lack of sustainability. It is not simply a question of more money, but do we spend wisely as well?"

5. High-tech capabilities

Should the Canadian Forces focus more, less or about the same on high-tech capabilities (such as precision guided weapons and advanced information systems)?

More (60.2%):

"The Canadian Forces must focus more on high-tech capability to remain relevant. Technologically, the Canadian Forces must focus on 'precision engagement' capabilities — the ability to attack targets quickly, precisely, in all weather and terrain. This is the thrust of U.S. and to a lesser extent U.K. research and development. Interoperability demands it. Canada will rarely, if ever, become embroiled in a conflict without being a member of a coalition, nor should we, generally speaking."

"Precision engagement capability requires investment in precision guided munitions, and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities. Examples include Global Positioning System navigation

aids, secure data links (tactical through strategic), secure indigenous satellite communications (CANMILSATCOM), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and all-weather satellite reconnaissance capabilities such as what the planned RADARSAT II and III can give the Canadian Forces. Information technology today allows rapid sensor fusion capabilities enabling a modern military to win the 'information high ground.' It is a force multiplier, which means that the same combat capability can be provided by a smaller unit, philosophically speaking. Enhanced C4ISR capability is also valuable to UN Peace Support Operations — for example, the Coyote [reconnaissance vehicle] is extremely relevant to current operations in the Former Yugoslavia."

The same (11.8%):

« Les forces armées devraient garder le même intérêt que maintenant sur la technologie. Plus les systèmes sont sophistiqués, plus ils sont coûteux. Il n'est pas nécessaire d'avoir la toute dernière technologie, à moins que cela nous soit avantageux financièrement (le consortium international, crée par les États-Unis, pour la construction d'avions furtifs est un bon exemple ou cela pourrait nous être avantageux d'y participer). Il ne faut pas non plus que notre équipement soit vétuste. Il s'agit de trouver le bon équilibre (de façon générale l'équipement de la marine, à part les Sea Kings, est un bon exemple d'équilibre technologique). »

Less (2.7%):

"We're never going to fight a war where coalition assistance is not available, so why spend money on weapons we don't need? The U.S. will always exceed our weaponry, so why not concentrate on improving search and rescue, sovereignty and peacekeeping sectors of the Forces and leave heavy weaponry to the U.S.? We should dedicate less money to weapons research and procurement, and more to sectors that need money for everyday operations. Like peacekeeping (vehicles, soldier equipment), search and rescue (improved equipment, do research in this field), and national operations (drug smuggling). We're never going to need high-tech weaponry because the U.S. will always be able to defend us with their own weapons."

It depends (8.9%):

"This is a good question. We require a balance of both, but it's finding the right balance. High-tech equipment requires more technical courses, costs more money and soldiers have to be away from their families. This is turning into a balancing act: if technology continues to rise, we won't be able to train the soldiers fast enough or retain them."

"We need to re-look at our decisions on what capabilities we can afford and what we are willing to let our allies bring to the table. Do we need fighter aircraft? What is their mission on domestic operations? How often have we deployed them? Were there other countries there that could do the task as well or better? We have to start to cut costs in operating and maintenance. By cutting our fighter aircraft and increasing our transport aircraft we increase the Army's capability to deploy and resupply. Use some money to increase our capability to gather information on the battlefield, using smarter, less expensive means than fighter aircraft. This is only one side of the coin. More development and studies need to be conducted to obtain the right balance between the soldier, sailor or airmen and technology."

Same or more (3.0%):

"I think the same or possibly more in most areas. This is what gives a modest force an advantage over less modern forces and is critical to remaining relevant in working with our allies, especially the U.S. C4ISR [Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance]- related technology and information systems, including those related to ensuring that we have a good recognized picture of our coastal areas, should continue to be a focus. Precision-guided and enhanced-range munitions are also critical to maintaining effectiveness. An area where we might be able to be smarter is in the provision of administrative and support computer services, as this is an annual money drain, when most people only use less than 10% of their system's capacity. Every Corporal should not have a computer: they should have a leader briefing them face to face. Coastal surveillance is another area where technology could make up for limited re-visit capability with ships and aircraft."

6. Infrastructure

With a presence in every province and territory, Defence is responsible for the largest amount of infrastructure (such as buildings, properties and roads) in the federal government.

Should Defence increase, maintain the same level or decrease the amount of infrastructure for which it is currently responsible?

More (19.5%):

"Defence should increase its presence in all areas of the country. It is important to continental security, support to provincial governments in times of emergency and to the general feeling of security of Canadians for Defence to be seen in communities. This does not mean large investments in infrastructure. Many initiatives to increase its presence in parts of the country, or to relocate military units, has resulted in large expenditures for new purpose-built buildings and facilities that cannot easily be sold off if a change in location is then called for. Training areas and armouries for Reserve units should not represent large unrecoverable investments. There may be opportunities to share some facilities with civil authorities or commercial organizations. Existing Canadian Forces bases should not be closed, but old facilities should be eliminated according to an overall facilities management plan aimed at reducing costs while maintaining capacity (office, shops, warehouse, training, etc). Incentives should be provided to base budgets where savings have been achieved through innovative restructuring."

The same (19.5%):

"Efficiency demands that we decrease the infrastructure to the minimum level that a reasonably predicted surge requirement would demand. However, Canada is a large country and the Canadian Forces have domestic response functions. It needs a local presence from which to launch domestic operations or even to provide support to other government departments who may be providing the main response (forest fire fighting, search and rescue, aid to the civil power or authority). In this context, Defence infrastructure should be

regarded as a government and national asset (as opposed to simply a Defence asset) and maintained as efficiently as possible to meet the full scope of the government's security mandate (which, by the way, includes providing support to provincial governments as well). Such infrastructure does provide a mechanism to link the Canadian Forces with the Canadian public as well."

Less (25.3%):

"Decrease the infrastructure that we now have. Bases are expensive to maintain, and with the current limited resources available to the Canadian Forces the money must be spent on training and operational equipment rather than buildings in Canada that do nothing for the Forces that deploy on operations. Smaller bases with a limited role should be closed, and others rationalized and amalgamated into a smaller number of larger bases."

It depends (12.6%):

"Firstly, it must be remembered that, in crisis, a Force's ability to maintain operations is based on its depth. Therefore, cutting infrastructure in peacetime (i.e. when not in crisis) risks hampering the Force's ability to respond in a crisis. However, if in order to meet spending pressures the Forces must be cut, core military capability must be kept as opposed to infrastructure. 'Core military capability' are those tasks, organizations, personnel and resources that must be available for deployment. Above all, infrastructure cuts (or lack of cuts where appropriate) should be based on military need, not political considerations."

Same or more (4.9%):

"The space that the Canadian Forces presently are responsible for is only just acceptable, given the current state and size of the military. I would like to see more money spent on localized outposts, or detachments where personnel may be stationed. For example, there is no army presence in B.C. any more, and yet B.C., in an earthquake, is most in need of an immediate response by Army engineers."

Same or less (2.2%):

"I think that the amount of infrastructure maintained by the Forces should be driven by its operational needs and not political need. I

would see a need for bases on each of the three oceans and a couple or three locations in the rest of the country to support sovereignty. With adequate air, land, and sea-lift capability, the Forces should be able to respond where needed and when needed within Canada. As a final thought, no Canadian soldiers take the infrastructure with them into battle. They take training, equipment, skills, leadership, attitude, political will, etc. If we can get more of the latter with less infrastructure, then so be it."

7. Interoperability

The ability to work together on operations with Canada's closest allies has been a priority for Canadian Forces in recent years. Do you believe that Canada should enhance, maintain the same level, or decrease this ability to work with our closest allies?

More (63.8%):

"Canada has never fought a war or engaged in peacekeeping operations without significant interaction with the armed forces of allied countries. Given the nature of our role in world affairs, and our immediate proximity to the world's most powerful nation, it is inevitable that any future operations beyond our national borders will involve close co-operation with the military of other countries, particularly the United States. NATO and NORAD should still be important organizations in our defence posture, but as our participation in the war in Afghanistan shows, we must be prepared to fight quickly and unexpectedly alongside our allies in areas of the world that we have not been traditionally involved with. This requires detailed interoperability with especially the American military, both from a procedural and equipment point of view. This does not mean, however, the abrogation of national sovereignty; and the challenge will be to work more closely with — but still remain distinct from — our more powerful military partners!"

The same (16.0%):

"As Canada will never achieve the ability to mount significant military operations on its own, it can be assumed it will always be working with a partner or coalition. Therefore, the ability to work with our allies is significant. To do anything less will result in marginalization. The U.S. must be considered the only ally that it is critical to maintain compatibility with. At the same time, however, it is critical to maintain the ability to exercise Canadian sovereign decision-making while doing so."

Less (2.6%):

« J'ai disons très peur du travail conjoint avec les Américains! Selon moi l'armée canadienne devrait prendre ses distance d'avantage. Les

américains n'aime pas que l'on dérange leurs plans! Je pense ici au CF-105 qui selon moi à été mit aux oubliettes avec le lobby américain. Je veux en venir au fait que je ne désire pas que notre armée soit un « bataillon américain » officieusement. »

It depends (2.1%):

“This question cannot be answered without reference to our foreign policy and the place the Canadian Forces has in implementing that foreign policy. A former Prime Minister has noted that the prime function of the Canadian military is to influence our allies rather than to persuade our enemies. Thus an ability to co-operate with allies in a manner that impresses them (and which allows our government to take advantage of the opportunity which such co-operation provides) would be indicated. However the history of co-operation between the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (and its predecessors) and the Department of National Defence at the highest level has been rather spotty at times (famously so in the inter-war years) and probably has resulted in Canada frequently achieving less for its efforts than its investment in allied causes would warrant. Bottom line: can't answer the question until we are clear what we want a military for and how we will use it. But: the government must fully understand the policy implications of military co-operation. Ask John Diefenbaker!”

Same or more (6.4%):

“Canada should definitely maintain this role, and possibly increase it. We have an obligation as a first-world citizen nation to support such international operations for the purpose of making the world a better place. Not to do so would be wrong, and further act to illustrate Canada as inconsequential on the world scene. However, the international role must be balanced against domestic operations, which also are very important. As a side note, the Canadian Forces must win and maintain the hearts and support of the Canadian public. In doing so, the public will put pressure on the government to sufficiently fund and staff the Canadian Forces. But to win and maintain that public support, the Canadian Forces must be clearly visible in both international and domestic operations that bring some clear measure of value to the public.”

8. Quality of life

*In response to the 1998 report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, Defence has made substantial improvements in such areas as pay and benefits, parental leave and cost of living arrangements for personnel who are required to move. **Should the Canadian Forces do more, about the same or less regarding the quality of life of their members and that of their families?***

More (52.6%):

“Members of the Canadian Forces and their families deserve to be treated as other Canadians. Yes, military members have volunteered to serve Canada before self, but that very fact implies that Canada also has an obligation toward those who serve in uniform. Military personnel have a right to have some time as a family, to establish roots in their respective community, to have a common standard of living regardless of where they might be serving in Canada. They should not be expected to constantly deploy for long periods, as is currently the case.”

“For the Canadian Forces to be able to attract and retain some Canada’s brightest citizens, they need to constantly monitor, update and add to the existing quality-of-life initiatives. They need to adopt a multi-skilled professional development approach, and move toward a learning organization concept, in order to fully utilise the intellectual capability of each of its members.”

The same (23.8%):

“The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs provided much-needed improvements in the life of Canadian Forces members, and at this time it is probably enough. In the future, if benefits for serving members are to be improved it should not be at the expense of operational capability.”

“This idea of increasing one at the expense of the other is plain stupidity, and [shows] a total lack of understanding that the basic problem is a total lack of commitment to the military by the government. We are the second-lowest contributor to defence of all

the NATO countries, next only to Luxembourg; let's face it: we are a bunch of cheapskates when it comes to protecting ourselves and the world, because we worry more about our multicultural society and our social safety-net, and spend all our funds on those programs at the expense of defence. The thought of actually killing people in war seems repugnant to many of those in power; if this attitude does not change the members of the Canadian Forces will continue to leave, because they don't have enough of anything left to protect themselves, let alone anything else. All the benefits will come to nothing if there is no one left to fight."

Less (3.7%):

"The Canadian Forces need to do less with the quality-of-life issues. The quality-of-life pendulum has swung ridiculously from extreme left to extreme right. The members of the Canadian Forces have forgotten that they are in the military. They are supposed to go where they are needed, when they are needed, and do what is required to be done. Now, if you don't feel like being deployed you can whine your way out of it. If you are deployed, hey, the government will send your wife on a holiday to visit you overseas. Quit handling military personnel with kid gloves, they're volunteers, if they don't like it, they can volunteer to leave! It's become a 9-5 stay-at-home job. What's with three weeks' free leave prior to deployment and three weeks' free leave after deployment? We're at war, albeit a new kind of war."

"Money is not the answer — job satisfaction is. Instead of pay increases (which are nice), spend the money on equipment so personnel have something to do their job with and the job satisfaction will follow, along with the bonus of education to learn to use the new equipment."

Same or more (3.8%):

"We have come a long way in improving the quality of life of all Canadian Forces members over the past years. We should not stop, and have to maintain and increase in some areas the level of support we provide. Pay and benefits and access to quality health care must continue to be a priority. We should never again be allowed to fall behind other members of the Public Service in the way we are paid

and reimbursed for our services. We could learn a valuable lesson from our American friends as to how their entire society participates in improving the quality of life of their service personnel. Tax breaks and exemptions are common there, discounts at many retailers are common (this is done in Halifax at numerous businesses due to the close ties between the community and the Navy) and legislation to allow members of the Reserves serve without having to worry about losing their jobs. I do not believe, however, that we should stop doing anything to fund these initiatives.”

“The ability of Canadian Forces members to operate with good equipment, good support and enough manpower goes a long way to improving their quality of life. Considerable peace of mind of is given to families when they know their loved ones have all they could possibly get to perform a mission effectively and safely.”

Same or less (1.0%):

“The Canadian Forces should maintain the same level of quality-of-life support, or possibly slightly less now that structures are in place. Standards are now high, and no further augmentation is required if current policies are enforced. The most significant area that can affect quality of life is the deployment frequencies. This is a government issue and not a budget issue.”

9. The Reserves

The Reserves provide an important link between the Canadian Forces and local communities and a component of the Total Force that integrates full- and part-time military personnel. As part of this concept, Regulars provide the government with a ready response capability, while the Reserves augment and help sustain Regular units and, in some cases, perform their own unique tasks, such as the crewing of maritime coastal defence vessels. In recent years, the Reserves have played a significant role both at home (the 1998 ice storm in Eastern Canada) and on overseas operations (Balkans). Is this approach (as discussed above) to the Reserves appropriate? Why or why not?

Yes (57.6%):

"I believe this is appropriate. However, I don't think it has been taken far enough. I believe the training that most reservists receive is substandard. Hence the stereotyping that Reserves are less than equals to Regular Force personnel. This is generated by part-time people with less experience and training being compared with full-time soldiers. I single out the Army as the most lax, because the Air Force *must* have properly qualified people to work on the aircraft, whether Regular or Reserve Force or civilian employees."

"The Navy has made great strides forward by placing reservists in charge of coastal patrolling (maritime coastal defence vessels). This allows them to obtain valuable sea experience and minimizes training required for them to transfer to a Regular Force vessel. The Army still has a definite barrier between the level of support and training received at Reserve units. If the total number of militia were increased and they received the same training as Regular Force soldiers, I propose that they would be able to supplement units being deployed to a 60-40 force or even as much as true 50-50 split. The test of success could easily be done on the 'work-up' training, which while important has been reduced to a refresher for soldiers who have been overtaxed with multiple operations in recent years. I also believe the only way such a proposal could be implemented is with further legislation to protect the job security of reservists who make the effort to serve their country."

No (27.6%):

"In my opinion the Total Force is a farce and a stop-gap measure wrapped in a fancy bow and given a cute name to hide the fact that the government is not taking National Defence seriously. As a former member of the Reserves I have seen it in operation when it came into being in the late 1980s."

"Reserve units would be much more effective if they were given the resources to train and operate at a minimum unit level such as a rifle company (130 personnel) in the Army, or form an entire ship's company in the case of the Naval Reserve. Sending a few individuals to fill vacancies in a platoon in Bosnia may be a great experience for those individuals, but does nothing to improve the effectiveness of those individuals' units at large back home. Enabling Reserve units

to operate as a whole by initiating civilian job protection legislation (as in other nations) will not only boost the Forces' overall capability, but will also attract quality personnel to the Reserves."

It depends (5.0%):

"If the Reserves are properly trained and equipped, they can be a very useful support for the Regular forces. But so far as I can tell from comments from reservists over the past 20 years, they have never been properly trained or equipped. Resentment of the Regular Forces monopolizing all the equipment continues undiminished today — as strongly felt as ever. This is absurd. If the Reserves are not going to be given the essential training, skills and equipment to do their tasks, why bother? Shortages in the Regular Forces will invariably mean that the Reserves get inadequate resources."

10. The Defence budget

Defence spending for 2002–2003 currently stands at \$11.8 billion. Should the defence budget increase, stay the same or decrease?

More (87.6%):

"Increase by a minimum of \$5 billion per year as a high priority. The reasons for this are: 1. National sovereignty: if you can't patrol it, observe it, or protect it; you can't keep it. 2. Domestic credibility: for people to have pride and loyalty to this country they must see that it is defended by more than rhetoric. Also, in aid to civil power situations, the Canadian Forces provide the rapid response capability to the government in all areas. 3. International credibility: trade, international relations, and peace are all dependent on a nation's ability and *willingness* to defend its interests. To keep credibility on the international stage, this must be demonstrated. 'Soft power' doesn't work in the real world. 4. Economics: the economic spin-off of capital spending are demonstrated. As well, in developing new technologies and equipments, industrial capabilities are increased as is the skills and knowledge base of the employment base of the nation."

The same (2.8%):

« Il y a un discours au Canada qui prétend que toutes les crises vécues dans les Forces canadiennes sont d'abord une question de sous-financement. Il s'agit d'une erreur, encouragée par le lobby militaro-industriel. Avant de dépenser plus, les Forces canadiennes devront dépenser mieux, gérer mieux et faire des choix déchirants comme abandonner l'idée illusoire de la capacité de combat polyvalente. Elle est depuis longtemps un mythe sur lequel on ne veut pas revenir. L'injection d'argent neuf ne résoudra aucun problème de sécurité ou de défense tant et aussi longtemps que l'on entretiendra des illusions sur nos capacités réelles. Peut-être est-il temps de se demander ce que les Forces canadiennes font de mieux et d'abandonner toute activité secondaire ou dans laquelle notre capacité d'action est minime. »

It depends (5.0%):

"Why are we picking some arbitrary funding figure? The government should decide what level of defence they need and then fund accordingly. I believe that the government needs to decide that yes, it needs combat forces, and then fund them and stop interfering in defence contracting with the purchase of useless equipment such as the Airbus, Griffon helicopter, and the cancellation of approved contracts such as the EH-101 [helicopter]."

"That said, one item I do believe is critical is that the defence budget should not be used to pay for operations. In my opinion the government has caused many equipment shortfall problems by forcing the Canadian Forces to pay for operations out what is their maintenance and procurement budgets. How can the Canadian Forces budget for new expenditures in the form of operations and make plans for procurement in an ever-changing fiscal environment?"

Should additional funding for Defence be one of the Government's top priorities?

Yes (42.1%):

"The government needs to immediately boost defence spending as a priority. This has been recommended by a Parliamentary committee, academics and allies, and polls suggest it is supported by a majority of public opinion. Aside from providing an internal framework of order and governance, a state's most important function is to defend its citizens from attack. These days, we defend ourselves indirectly and in concert with allies."

"Canada has been a freeloader in the defence area for more than 30 years. During the Cold War, we spent less of our GDP on average than the vast majority of our allies and we continue this trend today. Based on comparisons with allies and analysis of requirements, estimates seem to peg our required level of defence spending somewhere between \$16 and \$20 billion. Past discussions on the topic always started with the premise that there was no threat that the U.S. would not defend us against. We have seen this is true, but on their terms. If we are not able to defend our own space and contribute to international solutions to conflicts (including war-fighting or otherwise), then we will have diminished credibility and influence and a corresponding decreased control of events that will shape our destiny. 'Peace is the dream of mankind, armed conflict is its history.' The government would be ill-advised to think that we have arrived at the end of history."

No (2.1%):

"The Department of National Defence has more than enough money. The problem is in allocation and spending. Simple increases in the budget will not gain a higher-quality product. On the contrary, it will simply allow the Canadian Forces to avoid the major restructuring that is required to make it an effective, deployable modern force which has some prospect of success in the current threat environment. A lean and hungry armed forces is more amenable to the fundamental changes in outlook, doctrine, structure, and organization that are required. Unfortunately, beyond fiscal pressures, the only means to change the attitudes of the military is through the shock of a major set-back or defeat. The Canadian

Forces still have not accepted that Somalia was a sign of failure. Sadly, it will take blood (high casualties or fiasco on a military operation) to force substantial and meaningful change to how the military approaches its role in war-fighting and the modern world. The Canadian Forces are too fat and happy, at the present level of funding, and certainly if the defence budget is increased."

"As a Canadian taxpayer, I am completely satisfied with the priority that the government grants defence in relation to other more important fields such as education and health."

B. Respondents' priorities for equipment

In the fourth question of the on-line consultation, interested Canadians were asked, "Do you believe that the Canadian Forces have the necessary equipment to carry out operations at home and abroad?" Of the 1,489 responses, 84.2% said *No*.

In a subsidiary question, they were then asked, "Is there any type of equipment that the Canadian Forces will require in the future that they do not currently have?" In their suggestions for equipment, the respondents gave 4,644 instances, ranging from the very broad to the highly specific. Many gave several examples of what they believed necessary.

In this appendix we list 48 categories and types of equipment, each of which respondents mentioned at least 20 times. They represent a total of 4,072 mentions, or 88% of the mentions for all equipment. Other categories that included the remaining 572 suggestions (and that do not appear here) each received fewer than 20 mentions.

We have organized the respondents' suggestions into four broad sections, depending on the primary area in which the equipment would be used — air, sea, land, and communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, followed by a brief section on other equipment. Within each section we have arranged the items by the frequency with which they were mentioned, giving the number of mentions after each item.

1. Air

Transport and heavy airlift aircraft	637
CH-146 Sea King helicopters – replace	200
New helicopters	186
New attack helicopters	148
New maritime helicopters	140
New aircraft generally	118
CF-18 Hornet fighters – replace	112
New fighter aircraft	87
C-17 Globemaster heavy airlift	75
CC-130 Hercules transport – replace	
or upgrade	75
New heavy lift helicopters	74

Unmanned aerial vehicles	57
CH-146 Griffon utility helicopters – upgrade or replace	56
Air-to-air refuelling tankers	56
CF-18 Hornet fighters – more	48
CP-140 Aurora – replace	39
CH-47 Chinook helicopters	32
CH-113 Labrador – replace	26
Patrol aircraft generally – replace	26
Joint Strike Fighter	20

2. Sea

Sealift and transport ships	365
Ships generally	116
Supply and replenishment ships	96
Submarines	74
New destroyers	62
Aircraft carriers	39
Roll on–roll off ships	31
Frigates	28
Coastal defence vessels	21

3. Land

Better uniforms	141
New tanks	137
Vehicles generally	92
Leopard tanks – replace	66
LAV III troop carriers – more	62
Itis utility vehicles – replace	56
Combat vehicles generally	41
LSVW light support vehicles – replace	38
HMMWV utility vehicles	38
Coyote reconnaissance vehicles – more	34
Trucks generally	32
Armoured personnel carriers	27
New Jeeps	20

4. Communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

Communications systems and equipment generally	87
Surveillance and reconnaissance equipment generally	50
Night vision equipment	22
Military satellite communications	21

5. Other equipment

Weapons generally	37
Precision-guided weapons and munitions	27

C. Respondents' comments on a defence policy review

The consultation's 17,642 responses included 412 (2.3% of the total) that commented directly on Canada's defence and foreign policies, although none of the 10 questions explicitly asked about the policies.

Many of these responses touched on the 1994 White Paper on Defence, noting that the provisions of this basic policy document were not being followed or implemented because of lack of funding. Others referred to defence policy in relation to Canada's foreign policy, frequently observing that the Canadian Forces are a tool for carrying out our foreign policy. Some suggested reviews of areas that respondents felt were deficient, such as policies on the procurement system, the readiness levels of the Canadian Forces, the Reserves, and the number and type of operations.

Over a third of the 412 policy responses — 144, or 35% — specifically called for full policy reviews: 105 for a review of defence policy, 13 for foreign policy, 20 for both, and 6 for a review of national security policy. This appendix summarizes the general trends evident among the 144 responses.

Defence policy review

Among the 105 responses suggesting a full review of defence policy, some felt that the federal government's update of the National Defence program is not sufficient:

A full defence review must be completed quickly, yet thoroughly, to determine both the tasks and resources necessary to carry out the government's direction. While access is appreciated, this update site and these questions are only a small and partial glimpse of what must be done.

This defence update is an attempt to paper over the cracks (or stuff the jack back into the box). Within a year, the cracks will reappear and the jack will be out. A new Defence policy is needed.

In response to individual questions in the on-line consultation, many pointed out that the topics raised major policy problems — on question 3 about the number of Canadian Forces personnel, for example:

We do not have enough personnel to meet the government's demands! Therefore, we either change the government's requirements for military support (another defence review) or we increase the size of the Forces. Unfortunately, the question assumes that there is a set pot of funds for rectifying the situation. This government must make some heavy decisions *without* considering funding. In other words, we either have a military or not.... We need to assess the need for the military (defence review), and then tailor the military to the requirement.

And on question 10 about the size of the National Defence budget:

There isn't enough funding for the status quo. Obviously funding will only [increase] if tasks and roles are decreased or eliminated. The government has to do a thorough review and decide what it wants from the Canadian Forces and fund it appropriately.... [T]his current review will do nothing to improve the situation.

The defence budget should be reflective of the roles and tasks required of and assigned to our military. That the military cannot meet all of its assigned roles and tasks with the current budget indicates that the budget should increase. With the current world situation, a viable military has not been a more important national priority since the 1950s. The government has a responsibility to review what we, as Canadians, want our military to do and to be, and then provide the funding necessary.

The most frequent references to a defence policy review were usually quite succinct; for example:

We desperately need to revise our defence mandate. We are currently structured (in the leanest possible way) to build a World War II army. We need to re-prioritize defence goals and responsibilities. Are we fighting terrorism? Iraq? Peacekeeping? All? None? Update the mandate, then talk about gear.

It is time to review and determine our capability requirements, from the very simple to the very complex.

What is our role? What is our policy?

Until a full review of the Canadian Forces is done, any transfer of lands should be put on hold.

Bottom line: can't answer the question until we are clear what we want a military for and how we will use it.

We need a complete review of the Canadian Forces. I would suggest a bottom up review [instead of] a top down review.

The answer to this question depends on what the mission of the forces is, and that requires a new White Paper! What is the threat and can we deal with it? Naturally this needs to be linked to foreign policy.

Defence and foreign policy reviews

A number of responses (20) explicitly linked a defence policy review with a foreign policy review:

It is also interesting to note that this survey is being done in the absence of any appraisal of Canada's foreign policy for the future. Surely foreign affairs and defence policies go hand in hand — why this unilateral defence approach? Do a major review of both, and on an urgent basis, please.

The type of equipment needed is obviously related to the foreign and defence policies that Canadians choose. The fact that this short period of consultation is being substituted for full and proper policy reviews is an indication the government does not want to hear the views of Canadians on these subjects right now, possibly due to polling results that show the public wants more defence than this government is willing to provide.

Most often the respondents assumed or stated that a foreign policy review would determine defence policy:

The Canadian government needs to develop and share a comprehensive foreign policy. A significant component of that policy needs to be the Canadian Forces.

A military review without a definitive foreign policy position within which to frame the military requirement is nonsense.

The Canadian government must decide what role Canada will play as a member of the international community and how to employ the Canadian Forces as an extension of Canadian foreign policy.

Several respondents were clear that a foreign policy review should precede a defence review:

The answer is predicated upon Canada's foreign policy. A review of foreign policy followed by a defence review to address the needs of that foreign policy is necessary. For example, Australia completed a comprehensive review of her foreign policy and developed a defence policy to include funding to address it. Without guidance on foreign policy, any notion of considering deployments of Canadian Forces abroad cannot be substantiated.

The government should decide [on] its foreign and domestic policy. Hence a Foreign Affairs-driven statement of the requirement for external employment of the Canadian Forces along with a definition of the domestic need should drive the Defence services program.

Lacking at least a parallel foreign policy review (which should have led a properly debated defence review), for what are we now preparing and equipping our Forces to combat?

The planning was not done before the cutting, and we find ourselves in a much different role. I suggest the following three priorities:

1. Defence of Canada. This has to be job one. But first we need a comprehensive risk assessment in this post-cold-war world to determine what are the risks, and then what sort of defence capabilities we need to address those risks. Then make sure those are developed and maintained. They may be very different than the capabilities we have now. This has to be the first priority, ahead of international ones.

2. Domestic relief operations.

3. International commitments.

The answer to your question depends on what the government of Canada wants to accomplish, as determined by a foreign policy review followed by a defence policy review.

Foreign policy review

The small number of responses (13) calling for a full foreign policy review alone usually did so with the assumption that Canada's defence policy hinges on our foreign policy:

Perhaps the question should be better stated as whether foreign policy should be altered so that our military isn't woefully undermanned or underequipped when the time comes to back up the policy with military means.

Decide as a government what your foreign policy is, what you want to accomplish and then ask the professionals what is required to fulfill those tasks.

[L]acking an updated foreign policy, for what are we equipping?

National security policy

The half-dozen responses that suggested a review (or creation) of national security policy seemed to imply that defence, foreign and domestic policies should be better knit together; for example:

The question that seems to be avoided is: What does the nation wish the Forces to do with regard to national security, and as an adjunct to foreign and international economic policy? There appears to be no policy cohesion. It is difficult to answer this question without a clear articulation of the Forces' foreseen roles, and the previous White Paper seems hopelessly out of date with the current realities.

Canadian Forces personnel are deployed at the request of the government based on a strategic assessment of the national interests for Canada. Until the government has a national security policy, it is impossible to tell if the Canadian Forces will be deployed more or less.

The current approach seems more resource-driven than requirements-driven. A strong case can be made that at this time we would be better served by a clearly defined national security policy from which we could derive our real requirements.

